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In early 2003, France actively tried to thwart the plans of the Bush administration to build international
support for a war to depose Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein. In response, calls in the United States for
a boycott of French products, wine in particular, rebounded through all forms of media. In the spring
of 2003, French business people even reported that the boycott calls were hurting their U.S. sales.
Using a dataset of sales of nearly 4,700 individual wine brands, we show that there actually was no
boycott effect. Rather, sales of French wine dipped for two reasons. First, they experience a cyclical
peak at holiday time, from November through early January, and the boycott was called during the
February to May period. Second, sales of French wine have been in a secular decline in the United
States. Sales in February through May 2003 merely stayed on trend. We contrast our results with other
recent work that has found evidence of a boycott effect but that omits the holiday effect from several
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In early 2003, France actively tried to thwart the plans of the Bush administration to build 
international support for a war to depose Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein.  In response, calls in the 
United States for a boycott of French products, wine in particular, rebounded through all forms 
of media.  In the spring of 2003, French business people even reported that the boycott calls were 
hurting their U.S. sales.  Using a dataset of sales of nearly 4,700 individual wine brands, we 
show that there actually was no boycott effect.  Rather, sales of French wine dipped for two 
reasons.  First, they experience a cyclical peak at holiday time, from November through early 
January, and the boycott was called during the February to May period.  Second, sales of French 
wine have been in a secular decline in the United States.  Sales in February through May 2003 
merely stayed on trend.  We contrast our results with other recent work that has found evidence 
of a boycott effect but that omits the holiday effect from several specifications.  French wine 
producers may be having economic problems, but it is not because of their government’s foreign 





I.  Introduction 
  Pressures to change consumer tastes and purchasing behavior abound.  Some come from 
market participants, such as producers and merchants who engage in advertising and marketing 
campaigns.  But nonmarket participants are also prominent, in particular the politicians and 
activists who encourage consumer boycotts for particular causes.  Boycotts are alleged to have 
helped migrant farm workers in California gain increased pay and to have helped end the 
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  1apartheid regime in South Africa.  They have been declared against French products following a 
resumption of nuclear testing in the 1990s, and most recently they were declared by part of the 
Muslim world against Danish products several months after the publication of cartoons of the 
prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper. 
 
Calls for a boycott can have one of three effects.  Consumers can honor the boycott, 
leading to a decline in sales of the product being boycotted.  They can ignore the boycott, leading 
to no change in sales.  Or, expressing opposition to the goals of the boycott, they can increase 
their purchases, leading to increases in sales.  In fact, this latter effect is alleged to have occurred 
regarding the boycott of Danish products in 2006 (Hitchens, 2006).  Thus, the aggregate effect is 
an entirely empirical matter. 
 
This paper studies the boycott issue by investigating U.S. consumer behavior during the 
run-up, major combat, and immediate post-combat lull of the Iraq War that started in 2003.  
France proved a tenacious opponent to U.S. plans to marshal a multinational force to invade Iraq 
and depose its dictator, Saddam Hussein, and calls for a boycott of French wine and other 
products rebounded throughout the United States.  Emotions ran high.  Taking a cue from the 
bandits of the Mexican mountains who eschewed government-sanctioned, peace-officer 
identification (Traven, 1934), one boycotter proclaimed on national television, “We don’t need 
your stinking wine” (Lou Dobbs Moneyline, 2003b). 
 
We find that at first glance, the calls for a boycott did lead to a decline in French wine 
sales in the United States.  However, at the time of the boycott, French wine sales had already 
  2been declining over a longer period, and just before the boycott period, sales of French wine had 
experienced a seasonal holiday peak.  When the secular decline and seasonal effects are 
accounted for, there is no boycott effect.  Our work builds on the previous work of Vannerson 
(2004) by using microdata on wine sales for nearly 4,700 brands in the United States and 
studying the effects of the boycott on the revenue share of French wine, the quantity share, the 
quantity, and the price.  Our results differ from those of Chavis and Leslie (2006), and we 
explain those differences below. 
 
In the next section, we review recent work on the French boycott.  The subsequent 
section presents the key results using the microdata, and the section following contrasts this work 
with the opposite results found by Chavis and Leslie.  A final section draws conclusions. 
 
II. Recent Work on the French Boycott of 2003 
  The U.S. boycott of French wine was not the first faced by the French.  In 1995, after the 
French military announced a series of nuclear tests in the South Pacific, Denmark embarked on a 
boycott of French products.  There appears to have been remarkable unanimity.  All Danish 
political parties signed a protest letter to the French government, and a Danish minister wrote a 
letter to his French counterpart, on behalf of the Danish government, to try to stop the tests.  In 
addition, a major Danish retail chain stopped marketing French products and was joined by other 
Danish retailers. 
  
Bentzen and Smith (2001) find a boycott effect at the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996, 
even after taking account of seasonal components and a trend decline in the market share of 
  3French wine.  They also find a possible longer-run effect through 1998.  However, they do not 
reject the existence of price effects during 1995 and 1996. 
  
The political situation in the United States in 2003 was quite different from that in Denmark in 
1995 and 1996.  Unlike in the Danish case, the United States was not united in its interest in 
punishing the French for their opposition to the Iraq War.  Rather, the country was deeply 
divided over the policy, and therefore many people not only saw no need to punish the French, 
but rather saw buying French products as an opportunity to praise the French for their opposition 
to the proposed war. 
 
Vannerson (2004) provided one of the first, if not the first, analyses regarding the U.S. 
boycott of French wines in 2003 by testing the following model 
t t t t t T H B W ε β β β α + + + + = 3 2 1    (1) 
In the equation, W is the revenue share of French wine sales in the United States, in percentage 
points, B is a dummy for the boycott period, H is a seasonal dummy for the holiday period, and T 
is a time trend.  These are explained below. 
The data are gathered from scanners in high volume supermarket chains in 64 major U.S. 
markets, and were provided by Information Resources, Inc. (IRI).  They include dollar sales and 
prices organized by country of origin, type of wine (table, dessert, and fortified, for example), 
label information, and the market where sold.  They run in 22 four-week blocks from September 
10, 2001, through May 18, 2003. 
 
  4The data exclude wine sold in restaurants and wine specialty shops, a flaw because these 
are the venues where higher-end wines are sold more frequently, and the French have a stronger 
position in the high end.  If anything, this should bias results in favor of finding a boycott effect.  
The use of supermarket scanner data also results in under-representation of states where 
supermarket sales of wines are limited or forbidden, in particular Massachusetts, New York, 
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, although Massachusetts allows supermarket sales of alcohol in a 
restricted set of stores.  Nonetheless, the data provide a consistent, accurate, and comprehensive 
account of most wine sold in the United States.  Descriptive statistics are shown in Appendix 
Table 1. 
  Vannerson identified the boycott period as extending from February 2003 through May 
2003, specifically January 27 through May 18.  In his first test, he compared sales during that 
period to sales during the previous four four-week periods and found that sales in the boycott 
period were 0.56 percentage points lower—2.55 percent compared to 3.11 percent—a 
statistically significant difference (top of Table 1).  The same holds true when all 22 periods are 
included (Table 1, column 2, a specification not in the original paper).  The French revenue share 
in the boycott period was lower on average than in the previous 18 four-week periods.   
  
Table 1 about here 
 
However, French wine sales ordinarily increase in November, December, and January, a 
significant holiday period in the United States.  To account for this, Vannerson added a holiday 
dummy for the three four-week periods from November 5, 2001, through January 27, 2002, and 
the three four-week periods from November 4, 2002, through January 26, 2003.  In addition, 
  5French wine sales were trending downwards even before the boycott, so Vannerson added a time 
trend.  Taking these two patterns into account, there is actually no boycott effect (Table 1, final 
column).  The decrease in French revenue share of wine sales in the United States during the first 
part of 2003 resulted from the end of the cyclical holiday peak and the secular decline of sales of 
French wine. 
  
This basic insight is robust to other measures of French wine sales.  It may have been the case 
that fewer bottles of French wine were purchased during the boycott period, but that they were 
more expensive on average, leading to no effect on revenue share.  Regressions using French 
quantity share as a dependent variable indicate that without a holiday indicator and a time trend 
the boycott appears to have been effective.  However, when these are included, once again the 
estimated boycott coefficient becomes statistically insignificant (bottom of Table 1).  This 
suggests that there was no boycott effect on the quantity of French wine sold in the United 
States. 
  
In contrast, Chavis and Leslie (2006) do find a boycott effect, in particular, in their preferred 
specification, a 13 percent decline in U.S. sales of French wine over the first six months after the 
start of the war with Iraq.  They use weekly microdata from IRI on prices and quantities by 
product and country of origin for December 2001 to November 2003 for wine sales in 
supermarkets and other general merchandise stores in four markets—Boston, Houston, Los 
Angeles, and San Diego.  Although their data are weekly, they have the same disadvantages as 
the Vannerson database along with the added disadvantage of potentially being unrepresentative 
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underrepresented because wine sales there take place in supermarkets only on a limited basis. 
  
There are other differences as well.  Most important, using the same dummy variable approach 
as Vannerson, they define the boycott period as the first eight weeks after the start of the war, or 
March 17, 2003, through May 11, 2003.  They then study the effects of the boycott on quantities 
and prices of French wine sold.  In each specification, the boycott effect is negative and 
statistically significant.  They also conduct the analysis using non-linear least squares and find 
similar results. 
 
III. New Results on the U.S. Boycott 
  We build on the Vannerson paper by exploiting the microstructure of the IRI data.  
Nearly 4,700 brands of wine were sold throughout the United States from October 2001 through 
May 2003.  Of these, 923 were French.  Using these microdata provides a richer dataset, allows 
us to gain more precise estimates of coefficients, and reduces the possibility of aggregation bias 
that might arise from summing sales of all French wines.  We test variations of the following 
relationship, an expanded version of equation (1). 
ijt t i jt t t ijt M N T H B W ε β β β β β α + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1  (2) 
W is some measure of wine sales—revenue share, natural log of quantity, quantity share, or 
natural log of price—for each wine i from each country of origin j in each of 22 four-week time 
periods t.  B is a dummy variable for the boycott period, the four four-week periods starting 
January 27, 2003, and is included only for observations on French wines.  H is a dummy for the 
holiday period, the three four-week periods starting November 5, 2001, and the three four-week 
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Following Chavis and Leslie (2006) and analogous to Vannerson (2004), T is an origin-specific 
time trend for each country or region of origin of the wine (Vannerson tests French revenue share 
but does not include separate observations by country of origin and therefore uses one time trend 
rather than origin-specific time trends).   
 
Among the other variables in equation (2), N is a wine-specific dummy, allowing us to 
remove a significant amount of unobserved heterogeneity, such as label aesthetics, the public’s 
perception of specific brands, and even general price level of the wine (although we do test a 
specification with price explicitly entered as an explanatory variable).  M is a month-specific 
dummy for each four-week period, and ε is an error term.  Origin countries and regions include 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, California, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New York, New 
Zealand, Oregon and Washington, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, South America, 
Spain, and Yugoslavia. 
  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show the key results.  Only coefficients for the boycott dummy are 
shown.  Column 1 is comparable to Table 1, column 1, in which no holiday dummy or time trend 
is included.  The results seem to provide strong evidence of a boycott effect, although smaller 
than that indicated in Table 1 when measured at the mean revenue share.  In Table 1, the boycott 
reduced the French revenue share by almost 20 percent (0.56 divided by 2.83), but in Table 2 it 
reduced the French brand-specific revenue share by only 3 percent (0.659 divided by 21.31; all 
revenue shares are multiplied by 100,000).  At the median, however, the size of the effect is the 
  8opposite.  In Table 1, the boycott reduced the French revenue share by the same 20 percent (0.56 
divided by 2.85), but in Table 2 it reduced the French brand-specific revenue share by almost 
1,000 percent (0.659 divided by 0.061).   
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Results for quantity and quantity shares as dependent variables similarly indicate a 
boycott effect, and all are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  However, these results 
do not take account of the special holiday effect experienced by French wine or the secular 
decline in sales of French wine.  In fact, many varieties of Champagne could have experienced 
dramatic decreases in the late winter and early spring, having been bought in December for New 
Year and then not purchased again until a year later. 
  
When holiday and trend effects are included, the boycott effect disappears (column 2).  In all 
cases—the revenue share of each brand, the quantity of each brand, and the quantity share of 
each brand—sales are unaffected by the boycott.  In fact, the point estimates for the effect of the 
boycott on revenue share and quantity share actually are positive, although these coefficients are 
not statistically significant. 
  
In their paper, Chavis and Leslie try specifications in which they include only brands that have 
strictly positive sales in their boycott and comparison periods.  We follow their lead in columns 3 
through 6, including all brands that have strictly positive sales in all periods in the regressions.  
In Appendix Table 2 we show the same results when all observations with strictly positive sales 
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months, rather than the Table 2 regressions of only brands with strictly positive sales over the 
entire period of analysis. 
  The results confirm the basic findings.  In most cases without the holiday dummy or the 
time trend, the boycott appears to have affected sales of French wines in the United States.  
Oddly, the boycott appears to be related to increased price, which Chavis and Leslie also found.  
However, in every case with the holiday dummy and time trend included, there is no boycott 
effect, except in the case of quantities, and here the boycott is related to an increase in the 
quantity of French wine bought. 
  Although the results are similar to those using the full dataset, we do not agree that the 
observations with zero sales should be omitted.  Chavis and Leslie justify this by noting that zero 
sales in any one period might result from stocking decisions of retailers or distributors, rather 
than consumers’ choices.  However, zero sales might also result from consumers’ choices, and 
thus including them provides valuable information.  Furthermore, if brands were being withheld, 
the number of brands with zero sales should be higher during the boycott period compared to 
earlier periods.  However, this was not the case.  For all of the 22 periods, the number of French 
brands with zero sales ranged from 504 to 518, with the median 510.5 (the average of 510 for the 
11
th observation and 511 for the 12
th observation when ranked from low to high).  French brands 
with zero sales during the boycott period totaled 509 (period 22), 510 (period 21), 511 (period 
20), and 514 (period 19).  The number of brands with zero sales actually decreased during the 
boycott period, hardly evidence of negative stocking decisions by distributors or retailers. 
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  One other important difference between the analysis so far and that of Chavis and Leslie 
is the designated boycott period.  They use two methods.  In the first, they limit the boycott 
period to the first eight weeks after the start of the war.  President George W. Bush delivered an 
ultimatum on March 17, 2003, that Saddam Hussein and his sons had 48 hours to leave Iraq.  
The war, dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom, began on March 20 with an air strike on Saddam 
Hussein’s compound (Airman, 2003).  Because their data are weekly, Chavis and Leslie 
designate the boycott period as March 17 through May 11. 
 
In their second method, a nonlinear specification, they use newspaper reports of the 
boycott and discussions of the boycott by Bill O’Reilly on The O’Reilly Factor, a Fox News 
show, as a proxy for calls for the boycott.  This method does not assume a boycott period, but 
instead yields an estimate of how long a boycott lasted.  In this method, they include a holiday 
dummy, although in their linear specification they do not.  We do not address their nonlinear 
specification further. 
 
How long was the boycott period?  Available evidence indicates that it started in mid-
February and was in full swing by mid-March, a period omitted from the Chavis and Leslie 
analysis.  The peak moments of tension may well have occurred in early March.  On March 5, 
France and Russia, which both hold veto power in the United Nations Security Council, and 
Germany announced that they would not allow a United Nations Security Council resolution 
authorizing the use of force against Iraq (The New York Times, 2003).  French Foreign Minister 
Dominique de Villepin reiterated this on March 7, backed up by Russia and China, which also 
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announced that France would veto a United Nations resolution authorizing the use of force, 
“whatever the circumstances” (Sciolino, 2003). 
 
To further explore the timing of the boycott, we conducted a Nexis search using the string 
“wine AND boycott” for major newspapers and transcripts during the period November 1, 2002, 
to June 30, 2003.  Lists of media included in these groups appear in Appendix Table 4.  In both 
cases, we excluded all non-U.S. sources.  As an aside, we note that the first time the term 
“freedom fries” appeared as a substitute for “French fries” in a major newspaper was February 
20, 2003 (Kiely, 2003) and the first time it appeared in a transcript was February 17, 2003 (Syler, 
2003). 
The pattern from both sources is clear.  Between November 2002 and June 2003, wine 
and boycott in the context of a boycott of French goods were mentioned in 187 newspaper 
articles or editorials.  None of these mentions occurred in November, December, or January.  
The first mention occurred on February 13 in The Boston Herald (Gatlin, 2003).  There were 23 
articles in February, 80 in March, 54 in April, 20 in May, and only 10 in June. 
 
Likewise, between November 2002 and June 2003, wine and boycott were mentioned in 
173 transcripts in relation to France and the Iraq war.  In November, December, and January, 
there were no references to wine and boycott related to France.  In February, there were 49, and 
this rose to 65 in March.  The number fell to 40 in April, 16 in May, and only three in June.  Bill 
O’Reilly first mentioned the boycott on February 24.  Although hardly scientific, these numbers 
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March. 
The content of these articles and transcripts also suggests the boycott started well before 
the start of the Iraq War.  As early as February 13, it was announced that U.S. House of 
Representatives Speaker Dennis Hastert wanted to put orange labels on French wine (Lou Dobbs 
Moneyline, 2003a).  Larry Gatlin in the Boston Herald on the same day wrote about the reactions 
of wine and food merchants to a consumer backlash that had supposedly already started.  On 
February 26, it was reported that Pennsylvania State Representative Stephen Barrar was 
proposing a resolution that would ask the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board to boycott French 
wine and liquor (KYW-TV Eyewitness News, 2003). 
 
To further measure the potential for boycott action, we searched a nonrandom set of 
popular warbloggers, the usually libertarian or conservative but sometimes liberal webloggers 
who supported the war effort.  An important mention can be found on Instapundit.com, authored 
by University of Tennessee Law Professor Glenn Reynolds, known by some as the blogfather 
because of his high web traffic and sizable influence among bloggers.  On February 10, 2003, he 
reported hearing from one reader that perhaps the time to start boycotting French products had 
arrived, and he announced that he “had already started buying Australian, Argentine and Chilean 
wines in preference to the French wines.”  On February 11, the message was a little saltier.  One 
reader from Dayton, Ohio, wrote that he was about to buy a bottle of French wine when a man 
next to him “looking at the same wine said, ‘[expletive deleted] the French, I wouldn’t drink it if 
it were free!’ and picked up another bottle of wine, Aussie I think, glared at me and walked 
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myself” (Instapundit.com, 2003).   
Indeed, that specific post led Australian wag Tim Blair, then a columnist for The Bulletin, 
an Australian newspaper, and an independent blogger (TimBlair.net), to encourage Australian 
wineries on February 19 to move quickly into the newfound opportunity.  “Attention, Australian 
wine exporters: the marketing opportunity of the century presents itself in the United States,” he 
wrote, “where French and German weasel wines are now shunned” (Blair, 2003). 
Other blogs show similar evidence of boycott action before the start of the Iraq War.  On 
March 6, proprietor Charles Johnson of the popular Little Green Footballs blog passed along an 
announcement for a demonstration to take place in Los Angeles in which people were to dump 
bottles of French wine in the gutter (Little Green Footballs, 2003).  In fact, by March 26, Jeff 
Jarvis, author of the Buzz Machine blog, declared the boycott passé:  “I see that NewsMax is not 
only spamming us with Boycott France popunder ads, they’re now placing Boycott France ads in 
at least the New York Times.  That fight is so old already it’s out.  France is so… so… pre-war” 
(Jarvis, 2003). 
  Despite that, we now investigate sales of French wine in the United States as if the 
boycott started after the beginning of the Iraq War and lasted only two months.  To start, we 
repeat the regressions of Table 1 but designate the boycott period as March 24 to May 18, the 
closest we can come to the Chavis and Leslie period of March 17 to May 11 (Table 3).  As 
expected, without a holiday dummy or a time trend, the estimate of the boycott effect is negative 
and statistically significant.  However, in contrast to the results using a four-month boycott 
period, when the holiday dummy and time trends are added, the boycott effect remains negative 
and statistically significant, as Chavis and Leslie found. 
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Table 3 about here 
 
  This may actually be a boycott effect, but not quite the way the boycotters intended.  
When the boycott dummy is omitted from the regression, but the holiday dummy and the time 
trend are included, actual purchases for the period January 27 to February 23 are well above their 
predicted value, the largest underprediction for all 22 observations (Figure 1).  There is evidence 
that this was also a time when people were actually overpurchasing French wines to protest 
against the boycott and the proposed war.  A posting on Gawker, a popular Manhattan media 
news and gossip web site and part of Nick Denton’s Gawker Media empire, mentioned an anti-
war protest on February 15:  “I’ll probably protest the war by staying indoors and consuming 
French products, but should you decide to brave the cold, here’s a map and logistics guide” 
(Gawker, 2003).  It appears that people might have shifted their purchases to February, with a 
corresponding drop in purchases in April and May. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
  In fact, when we separate all four potential boycott periods, the four-week periods from 
January 27 to May 18, 2003, we find this is exactly what happened (Table 4).  Without the 
holiday dummy and time trend, coefficients for the last three four-week boycott periods are 
negative and statistically significant when the French revenue share during these periods is 
compared to that of the four four-month periods running from October 7, 2002, to January 26, 
2003 (column 1).  Furthermore, the coefficients for the last two four-week boycott periods are 
  15negative and significant when all 22 four-week periods are included (column 2).  However, when 
the holiday dummy and time trend variables are included in the full 22-observation specification, 
the boycott effect for the period January 27 to February 23 is large and positive, as suggested by 
the residual plot of Figure 1, although significant at only the 10 percent level.  Boycott effects for 
the final two periods, March 24 to April 20 and April 21 to May 18, are negative but not 
statistically significant at all. 
Table 4 and Table 5 about here 
 
  Finally, we subject the full brand-level dataset to the analysis using only a two-month 
boycott period (Table 5).  We use a specification as close as possible to that of Chavis and 
Leslie, omitting the holiday dummy from column 2 (it is included in Table 2, column 2).  Even 
without the holiday dummy, but with the time trend, when all observations are included, 
including those with zero values, the boycott effect is not significant (column 2).  The effect on 
revenue share is negative, but with a t-statistic of -1.04 and a p-value of 0.3.  The effect on 
quantity is positive, but it is negative on quantity share, and in neither specification is it 
statistically significant. 
  Columns 3 through 6 show the same results with only brands that have positive sales in 
all periods, for purposes of comparison with Chavis and Leslie (regressions when all 
observations with strictly positive sales are included, even though observations for those same 
brands may have zero sales in some months, are shown in Appendix Table 3).  Results are again 
similar to those of Table 2, with one important exception.  The regression of revenue share with 
origin-specific time trends shows a negative and large boycott effect (column 5).  Although this 
is significant at only the 10 percent level, it is troubling. 
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seasonal holiday sales increase, and the regressions in columns 1 through 5 in this table do not 
include an indicator for the holiday period.  When that indicator is added, in column 6, the 
estimate of the boycott effect decreases in magnitude and becomes statistically insignificant.  
There is no boycott effect, even when the boycott period is designated as March 24 to May 18, 
the two months after the start of the Iraq War. 
 
V. Conclusion 
  On April 16, 2003, the same day that General Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. 
Central Command, entered Baghdad, the Washington Post reported that the boycott was having a 
painful effect on the French.  “American importers of French wine are reporting sharp drops in 
sales in the past two months, and other French products also have been affected.  The [French] 
Federation of Wine Exporters has called a meeting Thursday to discuss how to respond” 
(McCartney, 2003). 
 
  The data simply do not support this conclusion, however.  There is no evidence that at the 
retail level, American consumers as a whole turned their backs on French wines at a faster rate 
than they had already been turning them.  There were even news reports around the same time 
that the boycott had not affected sales:  
In fact, many of the anti-France movements have barely caused a ripple.  Sales of 
French wines aren’t suffering even though some bottles have been dumped down 
the drain.  And while some state legislatures threatened to boycott French-owned 
businesses, it lasted about as long as it took them to discover that French-owned 
companies in their own back yard provide thousands of jobs and products for their 
residents (Dang, 2003). 
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Interestingly, the boycott does not appear in the trade data either.  U.S. imports of French 
wine in February 2003 were 36 percent higher than they were in February 2002.  The year-on-
year increase was 43 percent in March, 26 percent in April, and a huge 50 percent in May, $97 
million in 2003 versus $65 million in 2002 (U.S. International Trade Commission, 2006). 
  We cannot rule out the possibility that the boycott had a very large effect on sales of 
French wine.  We can, however, rule out the claim that there was a very large effect in one 
direction—downward.  Rather, with the U.S. deeply divided over the wisdom of engaging in the 
Iraq War, the boycott threats might have had both large negative and positive effects, 
encouraging pro-war consumers to modify their purchases away from French goods, and 
encouraging anti-war consumers to modify their purchases towards French goods. 
  On March 14, three days before Bush delivered his ultimatum, Middletown, Connecticut, 
Navy veteran Bill Earls wrote that he bought a case of French wine in support of the French.  
“The French are making some good points and being maligned for it” (Earls, 2003).  Around the 
same time, Senator Evan Bayh (D-Indiana), when asked on The O’Reilly Factor whether he 
would honor the boycott, said, “Well, I’m not going to be running out to buy any French wine in 
the near future.  I’ll say that” (The O’Reilly Factor, 2003).  The most we can say is that the 
aggregate effect represented no change in preferences, a surprising result given that even the 
French themselves thought that the boycott had been effective. 
  Besides expressing anti-war sentiments, there may have been many other reasons to buy 
French wines.  They communicate a modicum of savoir-faire, and they are often cheaper than 
comparable California wines.  Perhaps people stopped buying Dannon yogurt instead. 
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Table 1 
Estimated Boycott Effect, Aggregated Data and Four-Month Boycott Period 
 






 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable – French Revenue Share 
Boycott Dummy    -0.560** 
(0.193) 
    -0.585*** 
(0.167) 
           -0.007 
(0.117) 
Holiday Dummy           0.488*** 
(0.075) 
Time Trend         -0.038*** 
(0.007) 
Adjusted R
2 0.514 0.349 0.841 
      
Dependent Variable – French Quantity Share 
Boycott Dummy    -0.493** 
(0.170) 




Holiday Dummy           0.394*** 
(0.067) 
Time Trend          -0.030*** 
(0.006) 
Adjusted R
2 0.515 0.365 0.818 
      
N 8  22  22 
Notes:  Boycott period is defined as January 27, 2003 to May 18, 2003.  Comparison period is defined  
as October 7, 2002 to January 26, 2003.  Holiday period in column 1 is November 4, 2002, through January 26, 
2003.  Holiday period in columns 2 and 3 is November 5, 2001, through January 27, 2002, and the column 1 
holiday period.  Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the estimate is statistically significant 
at the ten-, five-, or one-percent level, respectively.   24
Table 2 


























  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent Variable – Revenue Share 
   Boycott dummy  -0.659*** 
(0.229) 
   0.556 
(0.875) 
   -1.57*** 
(0.518) 





2 0.974 0.975  0.982    0.980  0.980 
           
Dependent Variable – ln(Quantity) 
   Boycott dummy     -0.134*** 
(0.025) 
    -0.004 
(0.059) 
  -0.095*** 
(0.032) 
    -0.084*** 
(0.031) 
  0.125** 
(0.062) 
  0.148** 
(0.074) 
Adjusted R
2 0.909 0.914  0.935 0.939  0.934  0.934 
           
Dependent Variable – Quantity Share 
   Boycott dummy   -0.672** 
(0.334) 
     0.501 
(0.803) 
    -0.728 
(0.684) 





2 0.981 0.981  0.986    0.984  0.984 
           
Dependent Variable – ln(Price) 
   Boycott dummy           0.008* 
(0.005) 
    
Adjusted R
2    0.944       
           
France-specific holiday 
dummy 
No Yes  No No  No  Yes 
Origin-specific time trends  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Quantity > 0 in all months  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Price on RHS  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
           
N 37,536  103,224  16,992  16,992  46,728  46,728 
Notes:  Boycott period is defined as January 27, 2003 to May 18, 2003.  Comparison period is defined as January 
28, 2002 to May 19, 2002.  Boycott dummy equals one for French wine during the boycott period.  Holiday period 
in columns 1, 3, and 4 is November 4, 2002, through January 26, 2003.  Holiday period in columns 2, 5, and 6 is 
November 5, 2001, through January 27, 2002, and the column 1, 3, and 4 holiday period.  Quantity shares and 
revenue shares are multiplied by 100,000.  Following Chavis and Leslie (2006), in the log of quantity regressions of 
columns 1 and 2 we add a 1 to every quantity for every brand in order not to lose those brands with zero sales in any 
given period.  Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate the estimate is 
statistically significant at the ten-, five-, or one-percent level, respectively.  All regressions include wine and month 
fixed effects. 
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Table 3 
Estimated Boycott Effect Using Aggregated Data and Two-Month Boycott Period 
 






 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable – French Revenue Share 
Boycott Dummy    -0.690** 
(0.200) 
    -0.788*** 
(0.224) 
           -0.305** 
(0.108) 
Holiday Dummy           0.460*** 
(0.061) 
Time Trend         -0.031*** 
(0.005) 
Adjusted R
2 0.608 0.352 0.890 
      
Dependent Variable – French Quantity Share 
Boycott Dummy    -0.618** 
(0.169) 
    -0.685*** 
(0.180) 
    -0.304*** 
(0.090) 
Holiday Dummy           0.372*** 
(0.051) 
Time Trend          -0.024*** 
(0.004) 
Adjusted R
2 0.639 0.392 0.888 
      
N 8  22  22 
Notes:  Boycott period is defined as March 24, 2003 to May 18, 2003.  Comparison period is defined as 
October 7, 2002 to January 26, 2003.  Holiday period in column 1 is November 4, 2002, through January 
26, 2003.  Holiday period in columns 2 and 3 is November 5, 2001, through January 27, 2002, and the 
column 1 holiday period.  Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the estimate is 
statistically significant at the ten-, five-, or one-percent level, respectively.   26
Table 4 
Estimated Monthly Boycott Effect Using Aggregated Data and Four-Month 
Boycott Period, with Months Separately Identified 
 






  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable – French Revenue Share 
Month 1 Dummy             -0.230 
(0.127) 




Month 2 Dummy             -0.480** 
(0.127) 
           -0.473 
(0.313) 
            0.066 
 (0.139) 
Month 3 Dummy             -0.810*** 
(0.127) 




Month 4 Dummy             -0.850*** 
(0.127) 
           -0.843** 
(0.313) 
-0.232 
  (0.145) 
Holiday Dummy           0.485*** 
(0.061) 
Time Trend         -0.036*** 
(0.006) 
Joint Significance of 
Month Dummies  
(F-Statistic) 
  18.46** 
 
3.72**    3.16** 
     
N 8  22  22 
Adjusted R
2 0.909 0.342 0.897 
Notes:  Boycott period is defined as January 27, 2003 to May 18, 2003.  Comparison period is defined as 
October 7, 2002 to January 26, 2003.  “Month 1 Dummy” corresponds to the four-week period, January 
27, 2003 to February 23, 2003; “Month 2 Dummy” to the four-week period, February 24, 2003 to March 
23, 2003; “Month 3 Dummy” to the four-week period, March 24, 2003 to April 20, 2003; and “Month 4 
Dummy” to the four-week period, April 21, 2003 to May 18, 2003.  Holiday period in column 1 is 
November 4, 2002, through January 26, 2003.  Holiday period in columns 2 and 3 is November 5, 2001, 
through January 27, 2002, and the column 1 holiday period.  *, **, and *** indicate the estimate is 
statistically significant at the ten-, five-, or one-percent level, respectively.  Heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5 


























  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
Dependent Variable – Revenue Share 
   Boycott dummy  -0.949* 
(0.554) 
    -0.938 
(0.900) 




     -2.00 
(1.79) 
Adjusted R
2 0.970 0.975 0.980    0.980  0.980 
          
Dependent Variable – ln(Quantity) 




   -0.180*** 
(0.045) 
   -0.162*** 
(0.044) 
    -0.066 
(0.067) 
    -0.075 
(0.068) 
Adjusted R
2 0.898 0.914 0.933  0.937 0.934  0.934 
          
Dependent Variable – Quantity Share 
   Boycott dummy  -0.874* 
(0.520) 
    -0.854 
(0.819) 
     -1.04 
(1.03) 
       -2.66 
(1.68) 
     -1.72 
(1.71) 
Adjusted R
2 0.977 0.981 0.983    0.984  0.984 
          
Dependent Variable – ln(Price) 
   Boycott dummy         0.014** 
(0.007) 
    
Adjusted R
2    0.938      
          
France-specific holiday 
dummy 
No No No  No No  Yes 
Origin-specific  time  trends  No Yes No  No Yes  Yes 
Quantity > 0 in all months  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Price on RHS  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
          
N 18,768  103,224  8,496  8,496  46,728  46,728 
Notes:  Boycott period is defined as March 24, 2003 to May 18, 2003.  Comparison period is defined as March 25, 
2002 to May 19, 2002.  Boycott dummy equals one for French wine during the boycott period.  Holiday period in 
columns 1, 3, and 4 is November 4, 2002, through January 26, 2003.  Holiday period in columns 2, 5, and 6 is 
November 5, 2001, through January 27, 2002, and the column 1, 3, and 4 holiday period.  Quantity shares and 
revenue shares are multiplied by 100,000.  Following Chavis and Leslie (2006), in the log of quantity regressions of 
columns 1 and 2 we add a 1 to every quantity for every brand in order not to lose those brands with zero sales in any 
given period.  Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate the estimate is 
statistically significant at the ten-, five-, or one-percent level, respectively.  All regressions include wine and month 
fixed effects. Figure 1 











0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Four-week period
Residual
January 27, 2003, to February 22, 2003 
 
Note:  Regression equation is Wt = 3.33 + 0.49*Ht – 0.04*Tt.  Standard errors are 0.069 for the intercept, 0.070 for 
the holiday dummy, and 0.005 for the time trend.  All are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 




 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Aggregated Data—Boycott and Comparison Periods 
   French revenue share   8  2.83 
(0.392) 
2.85 
   French quantity share   8  2.55 
(0.344) 
2.58 
Aggregated Data—All Months 
   French revenue share  22  3.03 
(0.375) 
3.02 
   French quantity share  22  2.71 
(0.311) 
2.71 
Individual Brand Data—Boycott and Comparison Periods 
   Revenue share*100,000  18,768  21.31 
(165.24) 
0.061 
   Quantity  18,768  7,758 
(64,791) 
15 
   Quantity > 0 in all months  8,496  16,731 
(95,076) 
373 
   ln(Quantity)  18,768  3.32 
(3.38) 
2.77 
   ln(Quantity) > 0 in all months  8,496  6.14 
(2.58) 
5.92 
   Quantity share*100,000  18,768  21.31 
(177.93) 
0.039 
   Price  11,860  12.39 
(9.12) 
9.99 
   ln(Price)  11,860  2.36 
(0.533) 
2.30 
Individual Brand Data—All Months 
   Revenue share*100,000  103,224  21.31 
(165.87) 
0.057 
   Quantity  103,224  7,954 
(67,943) 
14 
   Quantity > 0 in all months  46,728  17,312 
(99,957) 
409 
   ln(Quantity)  103,224  3.33 
(3.40) 
2.71 
   ln(Quantity) > 0 in all months  46,728  6.22 
(2.55) 
6.02 
   Quantity share*100,000  103,224  21.31 
(180.48) 
0.038 
   Price  64,754  12.31 
(9.05) 
9.95 
   ln(Price)  64,754  2.35 
(0.534) 
2.30 
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Appendix Table 2 
Estimated Boycott Effect Using Four-Month Boycott Period and Observations 


















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable – Revenue Share 
   Boycott dummy      -1.20*** 
(0.390) 





2 0.981  0.979  0.979 
      
Dependent Variable – ln(Quantity) 
   Boycott dummy    -0.073** 
(0.033) 
  -0.064** 
(0.032) 





2 0.924 0.927 0.920 0.920 
      
Dependent Variable – Quantity Share 
   Boycott dummy      -0.486 
(0.536) 





2 0.985  0.983  0.983 
      
Dependent Variable – ln(Price) 
   Boycott dummy        0.008 
(0.005) 
   
Adjusted R
2 0.936      
        
France-specific holiday dummy  No  No  No  Yes 
Origin-specific time trends  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Quantity > 0  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Price on RHS  No  Yes  No  No 
        
N 23,667  23,667  64,754  64,754 
Notes:  Regressions include all observations with strictly positive sales, even though observations 
for those same brands may have zero sales in some months, rather than the Table 2 regressions of 
only brands with strictly positive sales over the entire period of analysis.  Columns 1 through 4 
correspond to Table 2, columns 3 through 6.  Boycott period is defined as January 27, 2003 to 
May 18, 2003.  Comparison period is defined as January 28, 2002 to May 19, 2002.  Boycott 
dummy equals one for French wine during the boycott period.  Holiday period in columns 1 and 
2 is November 4, 2002, through January 26, 2003.  Holiday period in columns 3 and 4 is 
November 5, 2001, through January 27, 2002, and the column 1 and 2 holiday period.  Quantity 
shares and revenue shares are multiplied by 100,000.  Following Chavis and Leslie (2006), in the 
log of quantity regressions we add a 1 to every quantity for every brand in order not to lose those 
brands with zero sales in any given period.  Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate the estimate is statistically significant at the ten-, five-, or 
one-percent level, respectively.  All regressions include wine and month fixed effects.   31
Appendix Table 3 
Estimated Boycott Effect Using Two-Month Boycott Period and Observations 


















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable – Revenue Share 




     -1.54 
(1.31) 
Adjusted R
2 0.979  0.979  0.979 
      
Dependent Variable – ln(Quantity) 




    -0.081 
(0.064) 
    -0.101 
(0.065) 
Adjusted R
2 0.923 0.926 0.920 0.920 
      
Dependent Variable – Quantity Share 
   Boycott dummy      -0.745 
(0.835) 
       -2.00 
(1.23) 
     -1.35 
(1.25) 
Adjusted R
2 0.982  0.983  0.983 
      
Dependent Variable – ln(Price) 
   Boycott dummy     0.019** 
(0.007) 
   
Adjusted R
2 0.934      
        
France-specific holiday dummy  No  No  No  Yes 
Origin-specific time trends  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Quantity > 0  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Price on RHS  No  Yes  No  No 
        
N 11,860  11,860  64,754  64,754 
Notes:  Regressions include all observations with strictly positive sales, even though observations for 
those same brands may have zero sales in some months, rather than the Table 5 regressions of only 
brands with strictly positive sales over the entire period of analysis.  Columns 1 through 4 correspond to 
Table 5, columns 3 through 6.  Boycott period is defined as March 24, 2003 to May 18, 2003.  
Comparison period is defined as March 25, 2002 to May 19, 2002.  Boycott dummy equals one for 
French wine during the boycott period.  Holiday period in columns 1 and 2 is November 4, 2002, through 
January 26, 2003.  Holiday period in columns 3 and 4 is November 5, 2001, through January 27, 2002, 
and the column 1 and 2 holiday period.  Quantity shares and revenue shares are multiplied by 100,000.  
Following Chavis and Leslie (2006), in the log of quantity regressions we add a 1 to every quantity for 
every brand in order not to lose those brands with zero sales in any given period.  Heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate the estimate is statistically significant at 
the ten-, five-, or one-percent level, respectively.  All regressions include wine and month fixed effects. 
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Appendix Table 4 
Major Newspapers and Transcripts 
 
Major Newspapers (excluding non-U.S. newspapers) 
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution 
The Baltimore Sun 
The Boston Globe 
The Boston Herald 
The Buffalo News 
The Charlotte Observer 
Chicago Sun-Times 
Chicago Tribune 
The Christian Science Monitor 
The Columbus Dispatch 
The Courier-Journal (Louisville, Kentucky) 
Daily News (New York) 
The Dallas Morning News 
The Denver Post 
Detroit Free Press 
The Detroit News (Michigan) 
Fort Worth Star-Telegram 
The Hartford Courant 
The Houston Chronicle 
The Idaho Statesman (Boise) 
The Indianapolis Star (Indiana) 
Journal of Commerce 
The Kansas City Star 
Los Angeles Times 
Miami Herald 
The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
The Myrtle Beach Sun-News 
The New York Times 
Newsday (New York, NY) 
Omaha World Herald 
The Orange County Register 
The Oregonian 
Orlando Sentinel 
The Philadelphia Daily News 
The Philadelphia Inquirer 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
The Plain Dealer 
Rocky Mountain News 
Sacramento Bee 
Saint Paul Pioneer Press 
San Antonio Express-News 
San Diego Union-Tribune 
The San Francisco Chronicle 
San Jose Mercury News 
The Seattle Times 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
St. Petersburg Times 
Star Tribune (Minneapolis MN) 
Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale) 
The Tampa Tribune 
The Times-Picayune 
USA Today 
The Washington Post 
 
Transcripts (excluding non-U.S. transcripts) 
 
ABC News Transcripts 
Burrelle’s Transcripts 
CBS News Transcripts 
The Charlie Rose Show 
CNBC/Dow Jones Business Video 
CNBC News 
CNN 
CNN Financial All 
CNN Financial Network Transcripts 
CNN International 
CQ Congressional Testimony 
CQ Transcriptions 
FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire 
FDCH News Service Capitol Report 
Federal News Service 
Fox News Network 
MSNBC 
National Narrowcast Network Transcripts 
National Public Radio 
NBC News 
The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer 
The Nightly Business Report 
Presidential Campaign Press Materials 
Video Monitoring Services of America 
(formerly Radio TV Reports) 
 
Notes:  For newspapers, articles and editorials were counted.  Letters were excluded.  All versions of the same 
article were counted if they appeared in different newspapers but only one was counted if different versions 
appeared in different editions of the same newspaper.  For transcripts, transcripts and teasers were counted.  If a 
show was aired on two different channels or networks, it was counted for each appearance.  If the boycott was 
mentioned in different segments of the same show, it was counted only once.  If a teaser for segment of a show 
appeared during the airing of the show, it was not counted.  
 